Hobbes’s theory regarding the hypothesis of a natural state of mankind

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Abstract: Due to Thomas Hobbes’s long exile (i.e. eleven years, between 1640 and 1651) in France, at that time governed de facto by Cardinal Mazarin, the founder of Louis XIV’s expansionist policy, some researchers consider that the political work of the British thinker refers to such a kind of political leadership. Other voices, however, associate Hobbes with the way Charles I tried to lead, namely as a sovereign monarch relative to the Parliament. However, Hobbes’s correspondence with Descartes comes to clarify this issue, in fact demonstrating the enormous influence of Oliver Cromwell on Hobbes’s political work. In this article we will analyze the relationship between law and natural right in the Hobbesian work of Leviathan in order to identify the manner in which the British philosopher explains the genesis and specificity of civil society.

Keywords: Hobbes, Leviathan, natural law, natural right, will of power, political power

INTRODUCTION
During the English Civil War (1642-1651), a disturbing thing came to light, which Thomas Hobbes will later note in his book the Leviathan (1651), namely that the nature of man is not good, but rather selfish and evil, seeking to destroy and to subjugate one another (Hobbes 2017, 95). This original wickedness causes that, in the natural state, in which “people live without a common power”, unfortunately “they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man” (Hobbes 1651, 62). The distinction between the intelligible and the sensible gives way to another distinction, namely that between success and failure. The truth is no longer placed in the dialogue between reason and senses, but between

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AGATHOS, Volume 11, Issue 1 (20): 17-31
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the accomplishment and failure of an action. In *The Elements of Law*, Hobbes defined the passion as “the motive power of the mind” and “the cognitive powers” or “faculties” as sense perception, imagination, memory, understanding and reason (Santi 2017, 57). For the British philosopher, there is only the *desire* as the main passion. *Desire*, however, is a passion that dominates man; it possesses him without him being able to understand it because his finite intellect is incapable of measuring against the infinite dispositions of the Creator. Thus, the action that arises out of desires most often becomes obscure, being justified ultimately only by its *success* or *failure*.

In this new theoretical context, the king becomes a character who loses all divine prerogatives, justifying himself as a presence only if he is needed. As a result, two questions arise: *Who needs leadership?* *What kind of leaders is needed?* Somewhat indirectly involved in the English Civil War, because he was in exile in Paris for 11 years (between 1640 and 1651) due to his initial affiliation with the Royalists, Thomas Hobbes tries to answer these two questions, which become the great challenge of his political philosophy.

Due to Thomas Hobbes’s long exile in France, at that time governed *de facto* by Cardinal Mazarin, the founder of Louis XIV’s expansionist policy, some researchers consider that the political work of the British thinker refers to such a kind of political leadership. Other voices, however, due to Hobbes’s royalist affiliation, associate *Leviathan* with the way Charles I tried to lead, namely as a sovereign monarch relative to the Parliament. However, Hobbes’s correspondence with Descartes comes to clarify this issue, in fact demonstrating the enormous influence of Oliver Cromwell on Hobbes’s political work.

In this article we will analyze the relationship between law and natural right in the Hobbesian work of *Leviathan* in order to understand how the British philosopher explains the genesis and specificity of civil society. What is of particular interest to us is to show that for the British philosopher a social theory could not be conceived before the foundation of an anthropology centered on the idea of desire and action.

**POSTMODERN INTERPRETATION OF LEVIATHAN’S FRONTISPICE SYMBOLS**
Hobbes’s philosophy was, in fact, a program of thought that ultimately aimed at a political reform marked by Cromwell's rebellion against King Charles I. This will be seen especially in *Leviathan*, a treatise
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printed in 1651, a year after Descartes’s death and ten years after the Cartesian work *Meditations on the first philosophy* was published.

*Leviathan* was a true political-theological treatise, having an impressive extent. Soon, the book became famous both in its content, but perhaps also in the imagery it imposed through its frontispiece. As a result, Thomas Hobbes, its author, became a famous writer and philosopher, who obtained the recognition both from Cromwell, and lately from King Charles II, too. He also gained recognition from well known philosophers from England, but also from the continent.

In fact, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the frontispiece was an important component of a book as it was a kind of brief summary of that print. And due to its symbols, this title page fulfilled the task its author needed. *Leviathan*’s frontispiece presented numerous political and religious symbols with great visual expressiveness, bearing witness to the fact that this work was written during the tumult of the English Civil War, a conflict that started and carried out especially on differences of religious opinions, but also under the political actions of King Charles I, who expressed some absolutist tendencies.

Figure no. 1. The engraving by Abraham Bosse on the frontispiece of Hobbes’s book, entitled *Leviathan or The Matter, Forme and Power of a Common-Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil* (1651).

Figure no. 2. Portrait of Oliver Cromwell, Lord Protector of England (after Robert Walker, 1650).
In recent years, special attention has been paid to identifying the symbolism of this image on the cover of the *Leviathan*. Many authors have tried various interpretations, but it seems that a hard-to-find code persists. However, this first page of the book was considered by all researchers to be an “essential component” or a “dramatic component” (Martinich 1992, 362) of the Hobbesian work.

The frontispiece (Figure no. 1), an example of Baroque art, was made in Paris by the French engraver Abraham Bosse (1604-1676), under the direct guidance of Hobbes. The upper part of the image presents an irregular landscape behind which a gigantic character threatens to rise, which everyone should be afraid of, because the world is tiny, at its feet. This character refers to the biblical monster Leviathan. But its representation has nothing monstrous, as we would expect because of its religious iconography. Magnus Kristiansson and Johan Tralau believe that this creature served a theoretical and political purpose, signifying fear and terror in the political context of its time (Kristiansson & Tralau 2013, 299-320). But if we look more closely at the central character’s face, we immediately find visible similarities to the image of Oliver Cromwell, painted by Robert Walker in 1650. It seems that this book was subtly dedicated to the future Lord Protector, Oliver Cromwell, the one who fought with the sword in one hand and the Bible in the other to impose a new political and religious order in England. As such, this book was intended to be a guarantee that upon his return home, Hobbes would not have suffered, but on the contrary would be appreciated, despite his royalist past.

Following the official image of Oliver Cromwell (Figure no. 2), the frontispiece of *Leviathan* presents a character who is the holder of secular and ecclesiastical power as he holds in his right hand a sword and in his left hand an Episcopal crosier. The tip of the sword and the crosier extend to the top edge of the image, ending in the phrase “*Non est potestas Super Terram quae Comparet us ei*” (There is no power on Earth to compare with), a verse from the Book of Job (41:24) that describes the remarkable power of the Leviathan, transformed under Hobbes’s brush from sea monster into a telluric political-religious leader. The power of the *Leviathan* character is characterized by the fact that it captures almost all the space, from the tip of his sword, which penetrates the Heavens, and to the base of the Episcopal crosier, which touches the Earth (Bredekamp 2007, 31-32).

If we look more closely, we can see that the body of the Leviathan is made up of thousands of people, all admiring the crowned face and
Hobbes’s theory regarding the hypothesis of a natural state of mankind recognizing him as a unique leader (Figure no. 3). This image thus predicted the fate of Cromwell, who would soon become Lord Protector, leading somewhat in an absolutist manner because he was leader of the state, but also of the government of the new republic.

The bottom half of the frontispiece (Figure no. 1) is a triptych centered by a Baroque curtain with the title of the book: *Leviathan: Or the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil*, as well as the name of the author, Thomas Hobbes.

The side panels show the contrasting symbols of the sovereign powers, balanced in perfect symmetry, which Bredekamp calls “a *more geometrico* representation” (Bredekamp 2007, 31-32). The composition of the side panels of the frontispiece corresponds on the right side to the sword (representing the attributes of civil power), and on the left side to the bishop’s crosier (we can recognize the emblems of the ecclesiastical power).

There is also a perfect respect for the symmetry even horizontally in the size of the small panels and in their correspondence at the symbolic level: the castle corresponds to the church, the crown to the miter, the cannon to the lightning of excommunication, the weapons of war to the weapons of logic, and the battlefield is similar to the Court of Inquisition as a field of ecclesiastical dispute. As an extension of the sword and of the Episcopal crosier, these panels show the extension of the spheres of secular and sacred sovereignty.
THE NATURAL STATE OF MANKIND WAS A STATE OF WAR

In Hobbes’s conception, the natural state is one characterized by restlessness, fear and mutual terror of the people exercising their natural freedom and this allows them to destroy each other, with the very risk of their own annihilation. The leader must introduce the functional order in the society through terror, thus reinvigorating Leviathan, the biblical primordial monster that everyone feared and before which all destructive selfish energies are anesthetized. This charismatic leader, who succeeded in imposing himself in real form just in front of Hobbes’s eyes through the success of his actions, was ultimately Oliver Cromwell.

In the *Leviathan* chapter dedicated to the natural condition of mankind, Hobbes first discusses an original state of war. In the spirit of the time, living under the fascination of allegories and metaphors, the English philosopher imagines, as a working hypothesis, a natural state of mankind, which must not necessarily have a correspondent in the real world. This natural state of mankind does not have a basis in a community that would be somewhere on Earth, but rather it takes into account how the human mind can imagine such a state.

For Hobbes, the natural state is one of war, characterized by the reign of brute force and deception and dominated by the fear of death. In the *Leviathan*, the British thinker noted in this regard: “It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor condition of war as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world” (Hobbes 2014, 98). In what follows, he admits that such a permanent state of conflict cannot be encountered in exotic communities in America or other distant parts of the world, which man could certainly not face.

The natural state imagined by Hobbes, considered more like a working hypothesis, was characterized by restlessness, by the manifestation of a general fear and terror exercised over all people, who fully fulfil their natural freedom which allows them to destroy each other, thus always risking dissolution. We can identify in this description of the natural state something of the utopian world of the first modern writers, who discovered the wonders of the exotic worlds without having an adequate understanding of those realms. The natural man imagined in *Leviathan* closely resembles the Caliban character in William Shakespeare’s *The Tempest*. The basic idea from which it starts is that people, by their initial condition, are relatively equal in their power, more precisely in their power to harm each other.
THE OMNIPOTENCE OF DESIRE - CAUSE OF THE IRRATIONAL THAT REIGNS IN THE NATURAL STATE

This original power of people to injure one another makes a civilized society difficult to achieve as long as the wishes of each can be freely expressed. Hobbes describes this state as follows: “And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which, nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies” (Hobbes 2014, 96). In Hobbesian anthropology, man is, first of all, a desiring being or, even more, “possessed by desire.” The desire leads to a generalized state of war, which originates in the competitive spirit of the people, in the mutual distrust and, above all, in the desire of each one for wealth and glory (Hobbes 2014, 96). In such a world, each eventually gets to want, sooner or later, the object of the other’s desire, which makes the war born of this equality of desires to become the actual expression of the natural state as such (Mairet 1993, 122).

In the Hobbesian philosophy, however, it does not matter so much what man wants, but that he lives in a universe built by his own desires, which spring from the dark depths of his being and which, by their character, actually capture the subject’s impulses, introducing a consistent dose of irrationality into social life. For Hobbes, regardless of the existence of an object that satisfies the desire born in the human soul, it cannot in fact be fully fulfilled. It remains a permanent living element, which defines the very essence of the human being, seen as purely desiring nature. Post-modern anthropologists (Lorenz 1974, 40) call it neophilia, defining by this term the desire for new, the desire for change, or the non-reconciliation with the present existential condition. This desiring status of the human being distinguishes the humans from the animals, which cannot be fulfilled in the field of neophilia, i.e. the fascination for the new and for the change. Man is, however, in a state of permanent desire, which, paradoxically, the more it is fulfilled, the more it creates a higher state of dissatisfaction and even of a greater desire, leading to an amplification of inter-subjective conflicts.

THE THEORY OF NATURAL LAW IN THE HOBBESIAN LEVIATHAN

Hobbes believes that, in the absence of a common power to impose general respect, the people in their natural state, governed only by the natural right, which consecrates them complete freedom of action according to their selfish desires, could only be in the condition of a
war of all against all (Hobbes 2014, 97). Natural law creates the premises for intra-specific killing, by which people have the freedom to kill one another. Thus, at least as a possibility, that state of war of all against all appears (*homines sunt in conditione Belli omnium contra omnes*) (Hobbes 1676, p. 79), having the role to transform the man, through the ferocity of the intraspecific aggression, into a real wolf for his fellow man (*homo homini lupus*).

Peace takes the connotations of an accidental state in relation to this condition of war, which has the role of essence of the natural state. Peace is a deprivation, a lack of the natural condition, being artificial. For Hobbes, civilization, which involves the benefits of agriculture through hard work, trade between distant spaces, grandiose constructions, writing, art etc., has nothing natural in it. Civilization is an exceptional product, created under artificial conditions, which makes it extremely fragile and exposed to great regressions.

In the initial state, besides the natural right, which allows people to be able to do whatever they want, there is also a natural law which calls for the protection of life. The original natural law, which involves the protection of life, is branched into a multitude of laws - also of natural value. Thus, it becomes a priority for natural right, regardless of the force with which it fascinates, to subordinate itself to the law born out of the frames of reason and which, in its essence, stipulates that any human being seeks peace. From this statement, a new possible formulation of this first natural law results, namely the fact that every he had to respect the Passover custom in Jerusalem person should defends himself by all possible means (Hobbes 2014, 101). As a consequence, a second law of nature is established, which in turn stipulates that the man be willing when there are others involved, insofar as he thinks it necessary for peace and self-defence, to renounce this right over all things; and to be content with as much freedom towards other people as he would grant them to himself. Hobbes consecrates this law by capturing its essence in the biblical text that says: “so in everything, do to others what you want people do to you” (*quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris*) (Hobbes 2014, 101).

Hobbes is aware of the fact that these natural laws are only normative and not descriptive as those in nature, that they can be violated sometimes or even, more severely, completely circumvented by individuals whose will of power is one that can become, in certain contexts, excessive.
The most favourable context for a certain power to be truly sovereign is war, the time when the transfer of the natural rights and freedoms of people, which are associated for the common defence, is almost total.

The power of the Leviathan comes from the transfer of a natural right. People have natural rights that are in line with their will for power, but which they transfer to a single force whose mission is to guarantee their life and property. The transfer of rights must be "mutual", otherwise it is about "Gift, Free-Gift, Grace", but in any case not a pact (Hobbes 2014, 103). By supporting this idea, Hobbes detaches himself from the unilateral transfer of power, specific to an absolutist monarchy. In fact, Hobbes was Cromwell’s ideologue and, through the Leviathan, the British philosopher tried to annihilate the whole ideality of the king and of the world.

In the Hobbesian vision, the mutual transfer of rights is a transfer of power, and this is done through a contract (Hobbes 2014, 104). Hobbes sees this contract rather as a pact, which means giving confidence to someone. Once the original state of war is installed, no one can save themselves using only their own power and cleverness. It is necessary to form alliances because outside them there is only death. In fact, no one can survive outside society. On the other hand, the violation of the association agreement is contrary to reason (Hobbes 2014, 112).

The exit from the natural state is therefore a matter of transfer of power, which appears in times of profound crisis of the natural state, when the State becomes incapable of providing man with comfort and existential security. Much later, the psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) will explain in a somewhat similar way the emergence of reason and consciousness. He considered them to be the result of a moment of deep crisis in the life of the primitive man, who could no longer regulate his life only by instinct, by an unconscious existence. The traumatic experiences, on the brink of extinction, made this man to detain and to order all these imminent dangers into causal structures, perfecting and remembering the answers to such situations even long time after the danger has passed.

The French philosopher Henri Bergson (1859-1914), in L’Évolution créatrice (Creative Evolution) (1907), noted precisely that, unlike animals that use tools, such as monkeys, men did not throw their tools of work, but, on the contrary, they perfected these items, then constructing various technologies based on which the artificial
universe emerged into the world. The idea of the artificial penetrating the real world is also found in Hobbes’s *Leviathan*. The contract, by which the power is transferred through the convention, has the role of detaching the human being from the rhythm of nature and bringing the technicality into the social life, but also the role to remove the man from the stereotypical and non-strategic actions and to place him in the new frameworks of an action that does not belong to him because it is commanded him from the outside. As such, an ineffable order is imposed to man and this new order is built autonomously, beyond the frameworks of a life that belonged to the non-historical existence. This new order will gradually be defined and will become in time civilization. Thus, the political power is equivalent to a true voice of the high forms of the consciousness, which already refers itself to a Super-ego as an ethical court, which can instill the feeling of guilt, of restlessness, in relation to the structures of the unconscious, building the frames of what it means, ultimately, to be human and to accept the gifts of culture.

The transfer of power also involves the transfer of the means by which the power is exercised (Hobbes 2014, 102). The more people establish the convention between them, the greater the power of the one to whom the means of the others have been transferred. So, the Leviathan is created from several subassemblies. The power can be transferred from the level of isolated individuals or from leaders of small groups to religious leaders, who “shepherd” many believers, to leaders of elitist groups or to the leaders of gangs, armed or not. However, the Leviathan is imagined by Hobbes as something concrete, being real only in the human world, as a true social body similar to the physical one in its functioning. The philosopher considers that man is above the animals, however, also for the simple reason that contracts with animals cannot be concluded, for, without understanding our speech, “they understand not, nor accept of any translation of right; nor can translate any right to another: and without mutual acceptation, there is no covenant” (Hobbes 2014, 106). Moreover, Hobbes tells us that there can be no agreement with God or with the World of Spirits. There is no contract with God, with the transcendence, as it cannot be integrated into the body, neither in its physical aspect nor in its social one (Hobbes 2014, 106-107).

The convention appears as a result of fear in the face of death, which can be imminent in the natural state because people’s actions are subordinate to selfish desires. In fact, two types of contracts are
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established: one with the Church, which must resolve the fear of the power of invisible spirits, and the second with the civil society, which must resolve the fear of being injured (Hobbes 2014, 108-109).

The third law of nature, which derives naturally from the first two, requires that people respect the conventions they have made (Hobbes 2014, 111). The Convention regulates the mutual transfer of power leading to the emergence of civil society, whose main task is to protect the right to property. Hobbes will very clearly specify this aspect in the following excerpt: “and therefore where there is no own, that is, no property, there is no injustice; and where there is no coercive power erected, that is, where there is no commonwealth, there is no property” (Hobbes 2014, 112). The British philosopher will thus bring the idea of ownership into the center of the political discourse, transforming it into a true philosophical concept, around which all other concepts that build the idea of civilization revolve. Following the path of the idea of property, we can understand the meanings of historical development, with all its ups and downs. Where there is property there must be history or, in other words, there must be a coercive force that protects and develops it. Property becomes the barometer that can indicate the degree to which the conventions of association between people are respected. Any disruption of the observance of the association pact brings mankind into the state of war, simply destroying its properties and throwing the fighters into the original state of fear and insecurity.

The fourth law of nature is that of gratitude, which can be formulated as follows: a man, who receives benefits from another, but only out of his grace, must endeavour to do so that the giver should not find any rational reason to repent for his good will (Hobbes 2014, 116). Through this law, Hobbes proves himself to be a cruel realist and a declared anti-Platonist. It is sufficient to compare this passage with the first part of Plato’s Republic dialogue to capture the fact that, for Hobbes, justice is a matter of reciprocity of the client-type relationship between the one who provides services and the one who receives them. It seems to be the logic that is specific to the mafia-clients type associations. The Socratic idea that someone could enter the social system only by its qualities of contemplating ideas seems, to Hobbes, one devoid of any trace of realism. For Hobbes, justice is imposed by people relating to their properties, for which they renounced to what they represent as entities connected to a possible inner order, of a metaphysical nature, in a Platonic sense. Moreover, the theme of justice is extremely ambiguous even for its creator, Plato, who, in the
Republic dialogue, except for an exceptional description of a utopian political model, fails to explain to us what is in fact authentic, eternal justice that the soul should bring into the world.

Hobbes’s world is not an ideal one, as the ancient Athenian philosopher imagined in the Republic dialogue, but a concrete one, in which people need their property to be guaranteed and protected. A ruling caste that would have everything in common, as Plato imagined the elite of philosophers, appears to Hobbes to be an aberration, for this caste would lack, in fact, what is the main motivation for sustaining social order and defending the individual that is the right to private property, the only guarantee of his freedom. Plato’s world is one of social classes and hierarchies seen in a rigid and mystical way, whereas Hobbes’s society is already one of individuals, who must opt for different types of freedom and constraint. In Plato’s world, the problem of the individual and his freedom did not exist, the priority being only the order of the city and its functioning as an autarchic body.

In Leviathan, Hobbes establishes other new natural law or laws of nature, such as:

The fifth law of nature is that of indulgence which stipulates for every man to strive to live in harmony with the others (Hobbes 2014, 117).

The sixth law of nature states for the rational priority of forgiveness of those who repent before blind revenge, whose purpose is to perpetuate the original state of war. Or in other words, the future is more important than the past and the peace-building through compromise is more meaningful than maintaining the state of war (Hobbes 2014, 117).

The seventh law of nature shows that, when revenge is necessarily required, its actual act, that is, responding with evil to evil, should not take into account the extent of past evil, but, first, the good that will follow (Hobbes 2014, 117-118). The main purpose of these laws of vengeance by punishment is especially that of correction, of the improvement of the wrongdoer, and not necessarily its destruction. Cruelty close to the state of war must be avoided. The priority in revenge must be, as far as possible, the preservation of the state of peace.

The eighth law of nature provides a total equality of the members of the convention, i.e. no one can keep any right in the state of peace unless he agrees for all the others to keep it (Hobbes 2014, 118).
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The ninth law of nature states that if certain things cannot be divided, then these things must be used jointly (Hobbes 2014, 118).

The tenth law of nature decides to ensure the safety of those people who have accepted the convention in order to achieve social peace, which is in fact the main purpose of the surrender and transfer of natural rights (Hobbes 2014, 119).

The conclusion of the book of Leviathan is that only through work, protecting the property and preserving the safety of individuals can be build a civil state of peace and prosperity. Hobbes is convinced that these laws of nature are immutable and eternal. The science of these laws is the only true moral philosophy (Hobbes 2014, 122). Laws of nature conceal moral virtues, such as justice, gratitude, modesty, fairness and mercy.

WHICH ONE SHOULD HAVE THE PRIORITY: NATURAL LAW OR NATURAL RIGHT?

The relationship between natural rights and natural law, which is at the basis of all power transfers, can also be understood by the metaphor of a balance. On the one side there is the natural right, with all that it entails - including the possibility of injuring one’s neighbour, either as an action triggered by the power of the affects on the soul, or as a premeditated action, like a revenge for killing someone close, as it is required by the law of retaliation (an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth).

On the other side is the natural law (or the law of nature), which defends life against any form of violence that would bring death. Depending on certain options at one moment, the balance may tilt in one direction or another. In the judgment that Pontius Pilate have done when he had to respect the Passover custom in ancient Jerusalem that required him to commute one prisoner's death sentence by popular acclaim, one sees the same difficult decision that must be taken relative to the priority of natural right over natural law. He had two prisoners in front of him: one was Jesus, and the other was Barabbas. Jesus renounced the law of retaliation, and thus to his natural right to avenge himself by violence, by crime, by the injustices of the abusive authorities. He accepted a kind of agreement with the Roman power, however absurd and unlawful it might have been, because it was an occupation power. Instead of a direct confrontation, such as that of the zealots of whom Barabbas belonged, Jesus prefers a certain discretion.
relative to this new power from which he is hiding, with some caution, in the Garden of Gethsemane, outside Jerusalem. Thus, Jesus inclines the balance, by His decision, in favour of the natural law, accepting the Roman earthly authority without rebellion, but, by this decision, He leaves open the conflict with the Temple priests who defended the tradition of the law of retaliation. In his turn, Barabbas - the zealot, faithful to the priests in the Temple, tilted the balance in favour of natural right, which he defended through violent actions against the Romans.

Pontius Pilate cannot easily choose and therefore he left to the crowd the decision to release the prisoner. The crowd, led by the Temple, will opt for the priority of natural right, manifested in the ancient tradition of the Temple by the law of the retaliation. This option was one with extremely serious consequences for the people of Jerusalem, who ended up shortly after the death of Jesus, namely in the year 70 AD, to see their city and the Temple destroyed after a devastating war with the Romans, and its sons being forced to go into captivity or exile.

The question of the priority of natural law over natural right remains an extremely complicated one, as is the case when someone is attacked and, in order to save his life, he has to kill. Another example is offered by Hobbes himself, namely that of a highly regulated societies, founded on the supremacy of the natural law, but whose leaders continue to look at one other with suspicion, finding themselves in the status and position of gladiators, respectively with pointed weapons and with their eyes fixed on one another, placing forts, garrisons and cannons at the borders of their kingdoms and constantly sending spies to neighbouring kingdoms. All these together constitute what can be called an attitude of war (Hobbes 2014, 98).

CONCLUSION
For Hobbes, the state of war is the heart of civilization because only this can create, at one point, a political power, which, in turn, becomes an economic power and, finally, a demographic one. Only in a state of war can a king impose his prerogatives in a complete manner. Peace is an illusion or a small oasis in the wilderness of universal war. Any genuine leader desperately seeks the state of war, feels it, smells it, prepares for it and metamorphoses into the most monstrous thing to achieve it, becoming the political Leviathan, ready to sow terror in the souls formerly bound by it. But if one, by his will of power, manages
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to stand up on his mane, even for an ephemeral period, he can see how
all men become equal in his face by submission. This submission to
the Leviathan is called political power and is the beginning of
civilization.

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