HEIDEGGER AND PARMENIDES

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Abstract: The research is concerned with the philosophy of Parmenides of Elea. This philosopher is one of the most famous thinkers of the Greek antiquity. His philosophy is important because it represents, in the history of philosophy, the first moment of thinking of Being in the horizon of ontology. This act of thinking depends on three conditions of possibility: 1. The co-affiliation of dasein and Being; 2. The fundamental identity between thinking and being (“thinking and being is the same thing”); 3. The primary language in which we call gods and all things in their essence. This research represents a reconstruction of Parmenides’ philosophy using the German transcendental idealism and especially Heidegger’s phenomenology. I think that Parmenides’ philosophy represents an essential moment in the history of philosophy, as compared with Heraclitus’ philosophy.

Keywords: Parmenides, Heidegger, transcendental idealism, intellectual intuition, ontology, Being.

INTRODUCTION
We hold forth to bring together, within the limits of the argumentative possibilities, Parmenides’ ontology (his theory about Being), and Heidegger’s horizon. Why would such an endeavor be necessary? From the prospect of this paper’s aim, such a demarche would offer a potential perspective to understand Parmenides’ ontology, and an update of it, for us. I believe that the modern and contemporary philosophy presents Parmenides’ ontology with the necessary tools to justify itself as ontological institution. The Parmenidean philosophy means the ontological institution of being. I shall try to explain the conditions of possibility for such an ontological institution of being. The Heideggerian horizon is the most suited, because it gives us a perspective to properly understand Parmenides’ philosophy. The stake of the Parmenidean philosophy is the ontological institution of Being. I shall explain three conditions of possibility concerning this fundamental act of thinking within an ontological dimension, and these

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conditions of possibility shall be presented from a Heideggerian perspective. We shall as well use the modern European philosophy, especially the German transcendental idealism.

THE ONTOLOGICAL INSTITUTION OF BEING
The Parmenidean writings that we shall refer to in this paper represent fragments from a poem called *On Nature*.1 After a careful reading of the fragments, we notice that these are allegorical. Should this observation not be accepted, the fragments present no philosophical relevance, yet, if we accept their allegorical form, we must find a way to interpret them and a hermeneutics for them. Sextus was the one to accomplish such a philosophical endeavor or attempt, in his interpretation of the proem: “in a chariot driven by two mares” (in Sextus’ interpretation, the irrational impulses of the soul), the philosopher [Parmenides] is carried “on the much-praised way of the goddess”, which means the “speculation established on the philosophical reasoning, which, in the shape of accompanying divinity, guides towards universal knowledge.” He is led by some “maidens” (meaning the “sensations”) and “heads towards the bitterly punishing justice, who holds the keys that lock and unlock”, “in other words, the reason endowed with the certain comprehension of things”.2

Such an interpretation contains terms like: speculation, sensations, reason, etc. If we look at the Parmenidean fragments excepted as a whole, we notice that Parmenides operates with the being-existence distinction, brings into discussion the possibility to conceptualize the being and follows a “canonic” rigueur in his ontological “description” of the being.3

Under these circumstances, we need to clarify the abovementioned terms. In order to achieve this, we shall direct our demarche towards the modern European philosophy, which, starting with Descartes and culminating with the German transcendental idealism, tried to analyze the faculties of human knowledge: intellect, reason, speculation, and what we may know with them: being,

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3 Ibidem.
existence, reality, subsistence or transcendence, and, starting with contemporary philosophy, real existence.  

An important “character” which appears in the Parmenidean fragments is this “goddess”. This goddess “offers” Parmenides “certain knowledge”. What kind of goddess and especially what kind of knowledge is this about? In his course about Parmenides, held at the University of Freiburg in the winter semester of 1942-1943, Martin Heidegger says: “thinking means taking into consideration what is essential, and in this taking into consideration resides the essential knowledge.” The essential Parmenidean thinking refers to a “goddess” called truth. The same truth is essentially the stake of the essential ontological thinking. In Greek, this truth is called aletheia. On aletheia, Heidegger pointed out, in his fundamental work, Being and Time, that we can think of it as the privileged state of opening in a phenomenological horizon, of the Sein towards an exemplary coming into being called Dasein.

We can accomplish another clarification at the level of the faculties of knowledge. The Parmenidean fragments only show a distinction between the senses, which are deceiving, and a type of thinking (nous) which guides us towards the truth on the way of persuasion. Yet, the way thinking is regarded on the way of persuasion needs to be explained from the perspective of the German transcendental idealism. In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant showed the difference between sensitivity, intellect, and reason. “The ability (receptiveness) to receive representations by the way we are affected by things is called sensitivity”.

We notice that, in Kant, the succession of the faculties of knowledge in the knowledge process is: sensitivity, intellect, reason, and the last faculty of knowledge must take into account what sensitivity provides, meaning the sensorial empirical material. Kant
considered as eristic that particular use of reason which did not take sensitivity into account and which operated on premises come forth from itself. Such a fallacious use of reason was represented – in Kant’s vision - by the speculative dialectics.

GERMAN TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM

Should we think about the Parmenidean philosophy, but considering, at the same time, a whole dialectical-speculative philosophical tradition, the Kantian instruments do not help. The content of the Parmenidean experience on the way of persuasion cannot be provided by means of the senses, “the way of persuasion” towards Being transcends the empirical-sensorial way (fragments 6, 7, 8). Under these circumstances, the Kantian reason cannot tell us anything more about the Parmenidean Being, because sensitivity cannot provide the material which can be ordered by the pure concepts or the intellect’s categories. It means that there is yet another faculty of knowledge, which is appropriate for such experiences, a faculty of knowledge superior to Kant’s pure reason. This faculty is the speculation or the speculative thinking (*speculum*, in Latin, means “mirror”). “The speculation supposes meditation and revelation on transcendence, on tonalities and processualities which pass beyond the limits of regular knowledge.”

Such a faculty of thinking is adequate for the Parmenidean philosophical demarche, because the Eleat speaks about Being (*estin, esti*) in terms of Divinity (it is unique, unborn, imperishable, indivisible, etc.). Thus, the matter of the Being, in Parmenides, transpasses the field of sensorial experience, placing itself beyond it, in intelligibleness. It transpasses existence as field of knowledge accessible to man in an empirical-sensorial manner. In the case of Parmenides’ philosophy, the separation of intelligibleness from sensoriality is rigorously followed. The speculative thinking is the knowledge instrument which applies on the way of persuasion towards Being. A discursive type of thinking, which uses the concepts of the intellect, applies to the existence accessible through senses, way rejected by Parmenides by choosing the way of persuasion towards the intelligible. In order for this entire mechanism to work, we need an instrument outside the mediated knowledge, meaning an unmediated, non-discursive, type of knowledge. Given that it is outside the

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mediated knowledge, it may represent a first starting point. In Schelling’s vision, this instrument is the intellectual intuition. As it is defined in the “System of Transcendental Idealism”, the intellectual intuition represents a sure, unique and necessary mean for the possibility of founding the transcendental philosophical demarche. In an intellectual intuition, the inferring subject is identical to the object inferred, thus obtaining the identity between the subject and the object. The intellectual intuition differs from the sensitive intuition in that the sensitive one does not entail the identity between the inferring subject and the inferred object, on the contrary, they remain separate.11

If, in the times of modern philosophy, the faculties of knowledge of the knowing subject started to be differentiated (intellect, reason, speculation), Parmenides makes the difference between nous and senses, or what we would call sensitivity. In Parmenides’ vision, the nous is linked to the speculative thinking, because, by its means, one can directly, non-discursively, get to the way of persuasion. The transcendental idealism fructifies sensitivity, yet it does not base knowledge on sensitivity. However, Parmenides clearly makes the distinction between sensitivity or the way of the deceiving senses, or “the way of the two-minded mortals”, and “the way of persuasion” or the way of intelligibleness, or the way of the nous. While in the case of the transcendental idealism, the stress falls on the knowing subject, in the case of the Parmenidean philosophy, the stress falls on the object of knowledge, an “absorption” of the knowing subject into the object of knowledge takes place, as we shall see further on. As for the nous, we also have to state that, starting with Homer and getting to Parmenides, the verb it provided (noein) did not have the meaning of imagining something in existent, “because its main meaning was that of act of immediate knowledge.”12 The nous can never mislead, because it was considered that this “faculty” of knowledge did not depend on the bodily organs and had a mysterious status, being something exterior to us, superhuman, i.e., in the last instance, of divine nature. What is even more amazing is the fact that, in a period when rational thinking had the tendency to overpass the Parmenidean and Heraclitean philosophies.13

12 W. K. C. Guthrie, op.cit., p. 28.
13 Ibidem, p. 29.
Hence we notice that there is a relationship between this intuitive *nous*, according to Aristotle, and the intellectual intuition that Schelling is talking about. Actually, the name of intellectual intuition is a little inaccurate, due to its function of unmediated knowledge, the intellect being a faculty of knowledge mediated through concepts. If the *nous* provides “those primary truths” in an intuitive and revelatory way, and these primary truths serve as starting point for the deductive argumentation, the same function is held by the intellectual intuition, as we have previously shown.

Together with the ontological institution of Being, Parmenides tries to strictly abide by its determinations: (unborn, unique, indivisible, eternal, homogenous, etc.). Parmenides clearly distinguishes between the way of intelligibleness (of persuasion), and the way of the deceiving senses. He does not consider sensitivity a possible activation or strengthening of the faculties of knowledge, and is fully entitled to do so, because, in the case of this philosophy, the stake is highly important: the ontological institution of Being. This ontological institution of Being can only be achieved at a purely intelligible level.

And now we have arrived at the nucleus of the demarche that we took on in this paper. “The fundamental sentence in Parmenidism, and thus, in the theory of being at its historical beginnings, through its great truth, thinking is one with being, could enforce itself as the very first in the system’s order.” Therefore, fragment number 5 of the poem holds a special status. If we consider that: “thinking is the same with being” enforced itself as the very first in the system’s order, it means that it has a foundationist character, meaning we can consider it from the perspective of the conditions of possibility for the ontological institution of the being. There are two ways of looking at the Parmenidean statement as at an intellectual intuition. The terms placed in identity are: “to think” and “to be” (the ontological subject is Being and it is defined not by *to on*, but by *estin-esti*).

1. *To think* belongs to Parmenides, the philosopher on the way of persuasion.

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2. *To think* belongs to the Being itself, as ontological subject.

These two ways do not exclude each other, but function simultaneously, merging into one another, should we consider that the stake of this intellectual intuition is to harmonize our being, of those who can have access to the way of persuasion, with the Absolute Being. (“Starting from the existential difference between the being in itself and our being as from an absolute given fact, Parmenides tries to legitimize the latter or to institute it as a term able to comprise the boundless, yet without limiting it.”\(^{16}\)

Can this be achieved? How can one encompass the boundless without limiting it? It can be achieved by this act of unmediated thinking, by this intellectual intuition which acts as condition of possibility for the ontological institution of the Absolute Being. Previously, Parmenides has made the distinction between the ontology of our mortal being and the ontology of the being in itself, while now, he is merging them. Yet, this merging is no longer on the way of the two-minded mortals, but on the way of persuasion.

Heidegger offers us a possible support: “if we understand thinking as a feature of man, then we think of a co-affiliation that refers to man and being. We are immediately assailed by the following questions: what does being mean? Who or what is man? Anyone can easily see: in the absence of a sufficient answer to these questions, we lack the base (Boden) on which we can understand something trustworthy about the co-affiliation of man and being. Yet, as long as we inquire this way, we remain trapped in our attempt to render cohesion (*das Zusammen*) of man and being as subordination and to arrange and explain it starting either from man, or from being.”\(^{17}\)

CONDITIONS OF POSSIBILITY FOR AN ONTOLOGICAL INSTITUTION OF BEING

The legitimacy of encompassing the Absolute Being through our being without limiting the former, can be established on this co-affiliation of man’s being with the Absolute Being. Man can be on the way of the two-minded mortals, and, in the first instance and most often, that is exactly where he is, but can also get to the way of persuasion, and thus be entitled to state that “thought and being are the same”.

\(^{16}\) Gheorghe Vlăduțescu (1987), op.cit., p. 78.
“Man and being are transmitted to one another and they belong one to another. But it was this unmediated, closer co-affiliation – man and being – which offered them those essential determinations by which they got to be understood metaphysically, through philosophy.”

In order to have yet another perspective over these matters, we shall present another case specific to modern philosophy, in which the same type of intellectual intuition cast away doubt and uncertainty, creating the conditions of possibility for establishing the philosophical demarche. It is Descartes whom I am talking about “the method” used by the author as the method of systematic doubt. What content had to be subjected to such a method? The whole philosophical tradition before him, the entire material provided by the senses, both outer and inner (I cannot know for sure when I am awake and when I am dreaming); even God’s existence shall be doubted in the first instance. Where will this take me? To the fact that I cannot doubt the fact that I doubt. On the other hand, doubt cannot be separated, or, better said, the fact that you doubt cannot be separated from the fact that you think. You cannot doubt without using thought. At this moment, Descartes had met all the conditions needed to get to that primary truth that he longed for. A sort of truth, or better said a sentence incontestably true, foundationist, which all the future metaphysical construction can be based on. Due to the fact that I doubt, and thus I think, I can admit I exist. It is absolutely certain that I exist, since I think. The fact that I think is in identity with the fact that I exist. This sentence, “I think, therefore I exist”, holds a special status as part of the Cartesian philosophical demarche. It represents, in spite of the “deductive argumentation” presented before, an intellectual intuition. The inferring subject is represented by thinking, the essence of this inferring subject being the thinking, and the inferred object is the existence of the inferring subject. Descartes had “proven” his existence, as an inferring subject, because, by applying the method of systematic doubt, even his existence, as inferring subject, was questioned. We follow the Cartesian demarche: “I doubt, therefore I think; I think, therefore I exist; I exist, therefore God exists”. We have already established that the fact of doubting is in identity with the fact

of thinking, and that the fact of thinking is in identity with the fact of existing. Now all we have to do is prove that the fact that I exist is in identity with the fact that God exists. This would mean following the thread of a whole mystical tradition, especially the German Christian mysticism. We shall only recall a representative quote, belonging to Angelus Silesius: “Ich weiss, dass ohne mich Gott nicht ein Nu kann leben/ werd’ ich zunich; er muss von Not den Geist aufgeben”. (“I know that, without me, God cannot live for a single moment/if I am destroyed, then He must abandon the Spirit”).

If we consider that the Cartesian demarche presented resembles the Parmenidean one, the status of the intellectual intuition starts to clear up. The Cartesian methodical doubt can join the Parmenidean doubt towards sensitivity and thus the rejection “of the way of the two-minded mortals”. Maybe the Cartesian methodical doubt is a radical one, while Parmenides believed in the intelligible path, the path that you can advance on with the help of the nous, this being considered an infallible tool or faculty in knowledge. I have presented “Descartes case” in order to better understand Heidegger’s vision of the co-affiliation of man and Being. As I have said, the stake of the Parmenidean demarche is a highly important one: the ontological institution of Being. In this case, the stress normally falls on the object of the demarche, while the subject of knowledge (Parmenides) falls in the “background”. But if we consider, just like Schelling did, that the intellectual intuition accomplishes the identity between the two “terms”, it means that it must be possible. So, the Parmenidean intellectual intuition must have at least one condition of possibility at ontological level, otherwise, it would lose its efficiency and status of act of unmediated, revelatory thinking. This co-affiliation of man and being represents such a condition of possibility for the speculative identity between the two. “The co-affiliation of man and being in the method of mutual provocation brings us amazingly closer to the fact that and the fact how man is bowed to being, and being conferred to man’s essence.”

Owing to this co-affiliation, Parmenides, on the way of persuasion, can state: “thinking and being are the same.” In other

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words: “[…] only a being can think Being.” The same co-affiliation, seen in Descartes, allows him to state: “I exist, therefore God exists”.

In this intellectual intuition, the two terms are: *to think* and *to be*. *Thinking* relates to the one on the way of persuasion, while *being*, to Being. The ontological institution of Being becomes whole through thinking. And the thinking of Being is legitimate on the way of persuasion alone, where the *nous* represents, as an infallible faculty of knowledge, the certain thinking, the reliable way to institute Being through thinking. The intellectual intuition mentioned represents a condition of possibility for this process.

The relationship between the other condition of possibility (the co-affiliation of man and Being) and this intellectual intuition (“to think and to be are the same”) is the relationship between form and content. The form is ensured by thinking (placed in identity with *to be*, on the way of persuasion), and the content is given by the above mentioned mystical experience of Parmenides. “Aristotle states that the way of persuasion (the Truth), after reason and truth […], is the same with the ontological institution.” Thus, the two conditions of possibility that have been explained so far support each other and legitimate each other, while taken together, they ensure the foundation of ontology itself.

Thus, two conditions of possibility concerning the ontological institution of being have been explained: that native co-affiliation of man and being, due to which man, as a privileged coming into being, can access the being, and the native identity between thinking and being, due to which the being can be thought on the way of persuasion. The third condition of possibility refers to the conditions in which that which is thought on the way of persuasion may be expressed. For this, we shall refer to Hegel’s vision on philosophy and art, and then to Heidegger’s horizon concerning poetry and primary language. As we shall see, this “primary language” that Heidegger speaks of, is the third condition of possibility for the ontological institution of being.

We must specify from the start what status Hegel confers philosophy, as part of his thinking system: philosophy is superior to art, because philosophy departs from the sensitive and gets to the level of concept, within the framework of philosophy, the absolute spirit

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24 Ibidem, p. 131.
meets the self-reflexive coming into being called man. In art’s case, we need to think over this coming into being through concept, in order to be able to create the bond or the dialogue between the absolute spirit and man. In his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vol. 1, Hegel explains the necessity for the absolute spirit and its relationship with the man considered a self-reflexive coming into being, to make history. The absolute spirit desires to know itself and to be free (free being someone who only relates to himself). When it is in itself, the absolute spirit cannot know itself, it is not free. Knowledge – in Hegel’s opinion – supposes a reference to another one (supposes two terms, because knowledge cannot be accomplished by identity alone, but it must also operate on difference). In order to be able to know itself, the absolute spirit needs its opposite or its another one. Hence, from being-in-itself, it becomes being-in-reality, successively conferring itself several determinations. (In Christianity, this process corresponds to the divine creation).25

Through the mediation of a privileged being called Dasein by Heidegger, the absolute spirit can know itself. The self-knowledge of the absolute spirit is achieved, in Hegel’s opinion, within the history of philosophy, which is exactly the philosophy, in its development. The various philosophies represent successive moments in the becoming of the absolute spirit.26

What status do the work of art and art, in general, have then? In his Lectures on Aesthetics, Hegel depicts the features of a work of art:

1. The work of art is not a product of nature, but achieved by human activity.
2. It is essentially made for man, and it is more or less taken from what it is sensitive for his senses.
3. It holds a purpose in itself.”27

The first feature is positive for the work of art, being a specifically human product, a product of a special coming into being. The second feature shows the inferior status of the work of art, as compared to philosophy, because any work of art has a sensitive

26 Ibidem, p. 42.
source, while the authentic philosophy springs from reason. However, Hegel redeems the work of art, including it in the evolution of the absolute spirit, by the distinction between talent and genius. Talent is distinct, technical, and may be obtained through education, while genius is caused by the absolute spirit, having a universal character.\textsuperscript{28} And because a long-lasting, authentic work of art is the one which stands under the sign of giftedness, art is also inscribed, together with philosophy, in the process of the historical becoming of the absolute spirit.

We must also mention what the relationship between the artist and the work of art is, in Hegel’s vision. It is a relationship similar to the one between the being-in-itself and the being-in-reality or the one between the Absolute Being and the privileged coming into being. Just like the being-in-itself, deprived of determinations, is known by the being-in-reality, which is its \textit{the other one} and which contains determinations, so the artist is known by his work. The work of art is the artist’s \textit{other one}.\textsuperscript{29} Therefore, the work of art has a purpose in itself, being an instrument by which the artist knows himself just like the absolute spirit knows itself by its \textit{other one} (being-in-reality).

If we want to customize this relationship between philosophy and art, we can do so at the level of the relationship between philosophy and poetry. First we have to clarify the status of poetry, to establish the essential features founding it. In his study \textit{Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry}, Heidegger identifies several stages in researching the essence of poetry.

We have also approached the Heideggerian vision on poetry because the form of the Parmenidean philosophy is poetic, allegorical, and the words chosen urge to amazement, as to the mystery of the possibility to be able to set one’s foot on the way of persuasion. The dialogue between the goddess and Parmenides strengthens this belief. Under this aspect we must look at the Heideggerian vision concerning the mystery of the primary language - “the mystery of language, in which the whole meditation must gather, remains the phenomenon most dignified of being thought and inquired, especially when it gives birth to the understanding of the fact that language is not a product of man: the language speaks” (\textit{Die Sprache spricht}). Man only speaks to the degree he fits with the language (\textit{indem er der Sprache entspricht}).

\textsuperscript{28} Ibidem, pp. 32-35.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibidem, p. 36.
These statements are not issued by a phantasmagorical ‘mysticism’. Language is a native phenomenon the character of which cannot be demonstrated by real facts; it can only be captured by a language experience deprived of prejudice. Certainly, man can artificially invent sounds and signs, but this only takes place by reference to a language already spoken and starting from it.”\(^{30}\)

Hence, the native language, being the language which names the gods and things in their essence, is the first one in the order of the further linguistic development. It can be considered a condition of possibility for the further development of language differences. Given that the native language is the language “to name the gods”, and the essence of things is captured in words, the Dasein (or, in Parmenidean terms, the one on the way of persuasion) that speaks it, is brought into a firm relationship and seated on stable ground. And if the native language is the language of authentic poetry, then “the poet’s utterance is not only grounding in the sense of free deliverance, but also in the sense of the firm foundation of the human Dasein on its ground”\(^{31}\). Therefore, if poetry represents “grounding of Being”, at the same time naming the gods and the essence of things and serving as grounding for these ones, “living poetically means placing oneself in the presence of the gods and living the amazement in the presence of this bringing close of the essence of things.”\(^{32}\)

Thus, Hegel’s statement is reinforced: the poetry which lies under the sign of excellence is not only a simple cultural and particular phenomenon, a simple ethnical or national expression, but enters the sphere of universality. Summarizing the landmarks of Heidegger’s demarche concerning poetry, we mention the following:

1. Language is the action sphere of poetry.
2. The essence of poetry must be understood starting from the essence of language (in the first instance).
3. Poetry is the founding naming of Being and the essence of all things.


\(^{32}\) Ibidem, p. 238.
4. Poetry makes language possible and it is the native language of a people belonging to history.

5. The essence of language must be understood starting from the essence of poetry and not vice versa (in the last instance).

Poetry holds a privileged status in the relationship between Being (Sein) and coming into being (Seiende). If we were to recall Heidegger’s study *What are poets good for?*, we would discover the German philosopher’s trust in poetry, admitted somehow sadly. A European metaphysical tradition burdened with the sludge of the prejudices concerning Being brought about, in the 20th century, the oblivion of the most miraculous philosophical issue (the one concerning the meaning of *to be*). Times are so poor, because the privileged coming into being called *Dasein* is no longer founded in the being of its coming into being. In such times, the poet seems a spiritual doctor.33

To conclude, in the first instance, we consider that philosophy and art are interconnected, just like reason and feelings are. The glacial coldness of Hegel’s concept interweaves in the happiest of ways, with the incandescence of the words spoken by the poet. We have rendered the relationship between philosophy and art, between poetry and philosophy, respectively, in order to portray the status of the native language. The native language is the language of the one on the way of persuasion, of the one who utters: “thought and being are the same.” If the co-affiliation of man and being represents the condition of possibility for that mystical experience, and the intellectual intuition (“thought and being are the same”) represents the condition of possibility to think the content of that spiritual experience, the native language (used to name the gods and things in their essence) is the third condition of possibility. It is the condition of possibility to communicate and express the content of the spiritual experience on the way of persuasion reflected through thinking. In the native language, the signs of the being on the way of persuasion: unborn, imperishable, unique, always the same, homogenous, etc. are spoken, understood and explained. The being is thought through these signs; they support this “native ontological construction”.

The research I have taken on in this paper is coming to an end. I have come to the point where I can draw some conclusions. The purpose was to analyze, to examine the legitimacy of the ontological

33 Ibidem, p. 246.
institution of Being from the perspective of the Parmenidean philosophy. Thus I have identified three conditions of possibility by which the Parmenidean ontology can be instituted legitimately:

1. Co-affiliation of man and Being (maybe the most spectacular of the three conditions of possibility).

2. “Thinking and being are the same”; intellectual intuition on the way of persuasion, explained as intellectual intuition from the perspective of the transcendental idealism developed by W.Fr.Schelling.

3. The native language (used to name the gods and things in their essence, according to the analysis made by M.Heidegger), and which is tightly related to the thinking achieved by the nous on the way of persuasion.

In the light that we wished to render the Parmenidean ontology, this one unraveled its actual condition, even though a long time has passed since its appearance. The stake of this ontology (the ontological institution of Being) interests us all, when, disappointed by the failures of the way “of the two-minded mortals”, we wish to get to the way of persuasion and to utter, beyond any doubt: “thought and being are the same.”

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